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In this article we focus on the transition from the traditional family business to a 
more complex situation that occurs when the ownership becomes fragmented due to the 
generational drift. We illustrate the critical issues, the decisions and the main tools that 
may be used to manage this transition. 
We consider that a firm is a family business when one or few families, with 
strong alliance relationships, own a percentage of shares sufficient to control the voting 
rights in a firm or a group of firms. 
The generational drift is a natural phenomenon that can produce fragmentation 
in the ownership of a family business, when it is not contrasted by specific succession 
policies. In the industrialised countries, many family businesses are confronting with 
this issue as they are in the second or third generation. 
The following tables illustrates such a phenomenon, referring to the Italian 
situation. 
 
Generation of  
owning family 
%  N. of 
companies
I 27.8  59 
II 41.0  87 
III 21.2  45 
IV 8.0  17 
V 1.4  3 
VII 0.5  1 
Total  100.0  212 
 
Source : SDA Bocconi-ISVI, 1997 
 




1 9.40%  49.50% 
2 32.30%  25.10% 
3 24.30%  15.90% 
4 17.00%  6.40% 
5 8.90%  2.10% 
6 3.80%  1.00% 
Over 6  4.30%  0% 
Average number  1.8  3.1 
 
Source : SDA Bocconi-ISVI, 1997 
 
Fragmentation is likely to increase in the next future as only 14% of the 
interviewed entrepreneurs figure out a single owner in the next generation, while 48% 
think of a group of siblings and 39% of another sort of group. The Italian data suggest 
that a number of family members are involved in the day by day management. 
 
Number   N. of cases  % 
entrepreneur 46  18.3 
entrepreneur + 1  56  22.2 
entrepreneur + 2  63  25.0 
entrepreneur + 3  51  20.2 
entrepreneur + 4  21  8.3 
entrepreneur + 5  5  2.0 
entrepreneur + 6  6  2.4 
entrepreneur + 7  4  1.6 
Total  252  100.0 
 
Source : SDA Bocconi-ISVI, 1997 
 
  The transition induces several changes both in the owning families and in the 
firms. As far as the families are concerned, we underline first of all the mentioned 
generational drift, with the consequent ownership fragmentation and, in many cases, the 
necessity to manage the exit of some family members. Another possible consequence, is 
the so called cooling off, which means that the links between family members become 
looser and, as a consequence, their identification with the firm is reduced. Family 
businesses are at the same time confronted with organisational, financial and managerial 
changes due to competitive pressures and growth. 
  The complexity increase as consequence of the following elements: 
•  More family members are involved in the firms, with different roles and 
expectations; 
•  In same cases external investors can become shareholders of the family 
business; 
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•  The increase of the firm size and complexity; 
•  Non family directors can be appointed; 
•  Few family members can serve as managers at top and medium level. 
 
We underline that a major issue is related to the differentiation of roles and expectations 
of family members (as they can be purely shareholders, or they can be involved also in 
the govern and management of the firm). A sort of agency problem occurs among the 
family actors, with particular reference to the dividend policy, the shares transferability 
and the communication policy to shareholders. This issues become more critical when 
external investors are involved. 
 
  Some key competences are required to manage the transition and to ensure the 
continuity of the family business. We can group these competences in two main 
categories due to their impact on the firm’s profitability on the one side and to the 
ownership unity on the other. A virtuous circle can be created, as positive financial 
results and family cohesion reinforce the trust among family members and firm’s 






  In the last part of the article we focus on some institutional and organisational 
tools, which help the creation of the competences required to manage the family 
business complexity. Each of them is designed to have a positive impact on the govern 
of the firm and of the family, as well as on the firm – family relationship. 
  We will briefly illustrate the following tools: 
•  The creation of a family holding; 
•  Family protocols; 













Unity •  Family leadership 
•  The role of third parties; 
•  The family and firm asset management; 
•  Rules against nepotism; 
•  The role of outside directors; 
•  The role of non – family managers. 
 
Many complex family businesses have created a family holding company. This 
decision can have the positive effect of strengthening family control over the  business 
simultaneously protecting against hostile take-overs. It also helps in raising risk capital 
without loosing control over the firm. A holding can be also considered a sort of 
clearing house in case of tensions and conflicts among family members. It results in a 
simplification of the decision-making process, as family matters are separated from firm 
strategy and operational management.  
A family protocol can be defined as a system of principles and rules to regulate 
family – firm relationships. It is an agreement among family members, which helps in 
creating a common mentality, in strengthening family cohesion and in dealing with 
tension and conflicts. In particular, family protocols are useful to build a culture of 
responsible ownership. 
Meetings among family members are aimed at informing the non active 
shareholders about the firm’s performance and strategic issues. They offer a context in 
which family – firms, as well as intra – family relationships can be governed. They 
contribute in separating family matters from firm issues and again contribute to the 
creation of a culture of responsible ownership. 
A very critical decision is the selection of the family leader. Family protocols can 
set the rules and principles for the selection process, while family meetings can help in 
building the consensus on this choice. The ideal leader of a family business is a person 
who is trusted by all family members and who can act as arbiter in case of conflicts. 
He/she should govern the process of changing family – firms rules, when this is 
required by the complexity of the family business. The leader also pays a crucial role 
during the family meeting, as he/she usually sets the agenda and acts as “time manager”. 
The role of third parties may also be important in the family business transition; 
they are normally family consultants, but they can be also appointed as outside directors 
and/or they intervenes when external shareholders invest in the family business. They 
may be helpful in smoothening the emotional side of family relationships and act as 
facilitators in case of conflicts or at least they can contribute in keeping open the 
communication channels among family members. 
The management of family assets becomes a key issue as a family has to manage, 
sooner or later, the exit of some members, due to the “cooling off” effect mentioned 
earlier, or to different opinions about the firm’s strategy. In other cases, the exit is the 
consequence of some events that undermine the among family members or, simply, 
because some member decides to start – up an his/her independent company. In these 
cases financial resources are needed as well as some free capital within the firm or the 
family. Obviously, a careful policy of asset allocation is of paramount importance to 
provide the liquidity that can smooth the exit process. 
Nepotism is a strong temptation in many family businesses and it undermines the 
corporate culture, the organisational climate and can lead to a lack of competences in 
the company management. The owning families should address this issue, including in 
  4the family protocols some explicit rules, for family members’ recruitment, for their 
careers and compensations, as well as for their specific training. 
The board of director composition is a delicate issue in complex family businesses. 
On the one hand it should meet the families expectations to be fairly represented in the 
boards; on the other end it should provide the competences required to govern the firms. 
The directors’ complementarity and the compatibility is also very important to ensure 
the effective and smooth management of the boards’ meetings. The shareholders should 
consider the opportunity to appoint non family members directors (outside directors). 
Their presence may become crucial to bring new competences and to provide external 
independent views on firm’s strategies; they can also contribute to the decision – 
making processes more structured, transparent and “de – personalised” . 
The presence of managers external to the owning family can also have a positive 
effect on the complex family business management, as they can bring new competences, 
they can contribute in broadening the company’s culture. They may also represent an 
useful term of comparison for the family managers. 
 
In this paper we have illustrated the mains issues that family businesses face during 
their transition processes; we have also presented a system of institutional and 
organisational tools, which may be implemented to improve the decision – making 
process during this critical phase for long term profitability and growth of family 
businesses. The key concept of governing a complex family business is to provide both 
the families and the firms with those competences that are required to manage the 
families’ cohesion and to ensure excellent firm performance. This is possible only if the 
family’s culture is built on values of responsible ownership and on the independence of 
the firm. 
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